Abstract-The management of security and privacy protection mechanisms is one fundamental issue of future smart grid (SG) and metering networks. Designing effective and economical measures is a nontrivial task due to the following: 1) the large number of system requirements; and 2) the uncertainty over how the system functionalities are going to be specified and to evolve. This paper explores a unified approach for addressing security and privacy of smart metering (SM) systems. In the process, we present a unified framework that entails the analysis and synthesis of security solutions associated with closely interrelated components of a typical SM system. Ultimately, the proposed framework can be used as a guideline for embedding cross-domain security and privacy solutions into SG communication systems.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
MART METERING (SM) is an important and essential component of the upcoming energy network, coined smart grid (SG). SM can be defined as the communication system and associated data management system which allow collection, processing, and distribution of information between smart meters, customers, and utility companies [1] . The importance of SM is that it interconnects SG components and functions within a two-way communication network. The objective is to support an economically efficient sustainable power system with high quality and security of supply. To achieve this objective, advanced SM functions might include automated meter readings (AMRs), distributed energy storage (e.g., of electric vehicles or EVs), distributed energy resource (DER) management (e.g., from renewable resources), as well as further energy efficiency mechanisms such as incentive-based direct load control and real-time optimizations for load shifting/scheduling. Ultimately, SM will help SG stakeholders to innovate and improve grid operations and services [2] .
It emerges that SG and SM systems are underpinned by the utilization of information and communication technologies (ICTs) . This exemplifies the increasing dependence of the society on complex systems combining power and automated control systems, communication networks, and computer applications. However, while SG systems provide clear advantages, the dependence on ICT gives rise to vulnerabilities and cyber attacks with potentially devastating results [3] . Risk analysis and impact assessment is a step toward securing (or upgrading the security of) any system. The application of such a process is nontrivial in an SM network, considering its architectural complexity and interfacing with cyber-physical SG functionalities, and the scale of the potential damages caused by attacks. For example, protection against unauthorized access and repudiation is a vital requirement for the AMR data to be trusted by both the utility providers and the customers. This requires end-to-end communication security, tamper-proof hardware (HW), trusted software (SW), and complex access control.
Data privacy concerns the security of data that are linked with, or infer information related to, the life of individuals. The problem of privacy protection is intrinsic in SM because frequent data collection from smart meters reveals a wealth of information about residential appliance usage [4] . Information proliferation and lax controls combined with granular smart meter data collection create a risk of privacy invasions.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we introduce a unified security and privacy protection (USaPP) framework that helps analyze fundamental problems of SM security and privacy, and search the solution space of security controls in a methodical and holistic manner. Providing a comprehensive security analysis of SM from different stakeholders' point of view is not the objective of this paper. Instead, this paper provides an overview of user-related problems and solutions as the basis for suggesting a unified approach. To this end, the main objective of this paper is to support the premise that the USaPP approach is vital for sustainable cyber-physical security and privacy management of SM systems, and, more generally, SG systems and similar complex critical infrastructures. As an example application, we study the security and privacy of an EV dynamic charging use case and apply the USaPP methodology.
We organize our material as follows. Section II describes a typical SM system architecture. Section III makes an overview of SM security and privacy problems. Section IV supports the rationale of USaPP benefits and introduces the USaPP framework. Section V analyzes further the subclasses of USaPP class elements and maps them with security controls. Section VI integrates USaPP with a system-level security analysis framework. Section VII applies USaPP to an EV charging scenario, and Section VIII concludes this paper. 
II. SM SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
We consider an SM communication system that consists of the following components: a smart meter which primarily measures energy consumption, a home area network (HAN) which is used for home appliances and devices to communicate, a wide or neighborhood area network (WAN/NAN) which connects HAN to control centers (head-ends) and interested parties, and a gateway which interconnects HAN with WAN/NAN. Fig. 1 shows the typical SM architecture that is being reflected in different USA and European standards such as ZigBee and ETSI machine to machine [5] .
Optionally, home automation, e.g., a home building energy system (HBES) or a home energy management system (HEMS), may also interface with the smart meter or the gateway within the HAN. An in-home display, often called as customer display unit, is a special device that provides a visualization of data received from the smart meter and optional submeters attached to specific appliances. Ultimately, a number of home sensors and actuators can be brought together to control and optimize energy consumption. This functionality may further be used to optimize renewable power generation and to reach carbon saving targets.
There are a number of options available for the communications outside the home, e.g., between the metering gateway and the power distribution network, utility, or operators. These include cellular technologies, wireless mesh/sensor networks (WMN/WSN), and various home broadband solutions. However, it remains to be seen if utilities and grid operators will be willing to trust the reliability and independence of some networks. It is likely that SM systems will use a mixture of ICTs. For example, data concentrators/aggregators may collect data from home gateways via WMNs and then send them to the utilities through fixed line communications.
A common SG functionality, which may utilize SM, concerns "demand, generation, and storage flexibility." One such flexibility program, known as demand response (DR), aims to reduce energy costs, to reduce peak loads, and to adapt the variability of renewable power generation. DR involves direct or indirect control of customer demand and consumption (e.g., remote control of home appliances) in order to apply peak demand shaving. An alternative program, known as demand side management (DSM), involves giving customers financial incentives to shift demands (that can be elastic) as required by the utilities. Both DR and DSM can effectively be implemented by collecting and analyzing customer energy data, making energy saving suggestions, and applying real-time pricing. The keen reader can find a good overview of DR/DSM functions in [6] .
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ISSUES
A. Related Work
While the focus of this paper is not an exhaustive survey of various security and privacy mechanisms of SG, we briefly mention in the following discussion some of the related work.
An early work discussing important security and privacy challenges of an SG is found in [7] , while a more comprehensive review of related issues and solutions is found in [8] . The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) document [9] provides a list of security requirements of SG and lays out a path toward the standardization of security solutions. The authors of [10] discuss several key technologies of SG, particularly public key infrastructures (PKIs) and trusted computing tailored specifically to SG networks. A reliability perspective of SG is elaborated in [11] , where a systematic and architectural approach is advocated for integrating the diverse ICTs to realize a reliable, secure, and smart power grid. This, in fact, coincides with the motivation of this paper in which we aim to provide a holistic framework for security and privacy of SM systems and, in advance, interrelated cyber-physical systems of the SG.
B. Fundamental Security Problems
SG/SM cyber threats, such as the Stuxnet worm [9] , have the potential to breach national security, economic stability, and even physical security. Power stations and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems have always been targeted by hackers; the move from closed communication systems to open IP networks opens up a new range of vulnerabilities. As previously stated, the study of SM/SG security is out of the scope of this paper. The keen reader may refer to the NIST guidelines for SG cyber security [9] ; these provide a good starting point and a foundation for SG security analysis, including security attacks, vulnerabilities, risks, requirements, solutions, and research problems. Also, a comprehensive specification of SM security requirements has been published by OpenSG [1] .
This paper focuses on the information security of the home SM system as described in Section II. The SM system may be attacked from many different entry points. For example, data integrity and authentication may be compromised through network attacks such as man-in-the-middle spoofing, impersonation, or denial of service (DoS) attacks. Similarly, data security may be compromised by sabotage/insider attacks such as viruses and trojan horses. The later threat becomes significant considering the distributed and shared nature of the SM system and its interconnections with different networks such as NANs and the Internet.
Once an entry point is found, it becomes easier for the attacker to cascade an attack along the SM system. For example, compromising the real-time pricing channel may result in energy theft or malicious remote control of appliances. Hence, rigorous HW/SW security is required to ensure the validity of different communicating parties such as head-ends and smart meters. For example, consider an attacker takes over the headend and sends all meters a DR control message to interrupt supply. The interruption can be made permanent by also commanding all meters to change their crypto keys to some new value only known to the attacker [12] . The impact can be enormous: millions of homes could be left without power until they are locally replaced or reflashed with authentic keys, people's livelihood could be affected, health and safety could be jeopardized, and businesses could lose millions. SM security needs to perform the following: 1) prevent such attacks from happening; and 2) provide a recovery/survivability mechanism in case of (successful) attack.
The communication infrastructures are not the only source of vulnerabilities. HW and SW used for building SM components are at risk of being tampered even before they are installed. Rogue code including the so-called "logic bombs" which cause sudden malfunctions can be inserted into SW while it is being developed. As for HW, remotely operated "kill switches" and hidden "backdoors" can be written into the computer chips, allowing outsiders to manipulate the system.
C. Fundamental Privacy Problems
The notion of privacy is complex and is perceived and defined in different ways in different countries and cultures. Privacy is associated with the notion of personally identifiable information (PII) that may be contained in or linked with certain data. In this direction, we would like to use the notion privacy in the context of the following two notions.
1) Anonymity is a property of how sufficiently the identity of a user associated with a message is hidden (rather than the message itself). 2) Undetectability is a property of how a particular item of interest (IOI) associated with a message is sufficiently distinguished by whether it exists or not. The SM privacy problem stems from the potential of a smart meter to measure energy consumption in much more detail than a conventional meter. Smart meters are expected to provide accurate readings automatically at requested time intervals (e.g., every few minutes) to the utility company, electricity distribution network, or wider SG to facilitate optimizations such as DSM and DR. Such detailed energy usage can be used to deduce detailed information about appliance usage and lifestyle patterns, as discussed in [4] . Quinn [4] also teaches that vague assurances of privacy (by the government) are undesirable as they often lead to regulatory capture and irrecoverable data misuse damages.
The importance of SM privacy and compliance with data privacy regulations has recently been highlighted in The Netherlands, in 2009, where the consumers' groups forced the government to postpone smart meter roll outs until after data privacy issues are resolved. According to the Dutch model, SM privacy requires technical specifications and justification for SM data collection and handling and provision of explicit, informed, and voluntary consent [13] . Further standardization activities in the U.S. and EU involve the development of legal and regulatory consumer privacy regimes that promote consumer choice and control over third party use of their energy data.
IV. USAPP FRAMEWORK
A. Rationale
Complex critical infrastructure systems which interconnect a number of independent subsystems to realize new functionality, services, and business models could lead to unforeseeable and unanticipated security, safety, and reliability-related vulnerabilities. Currently, a number of international efforts are underway to assess and implement guidelines and methodologies for security and resilience of ICT systems for SG. However, SG is not the first complex system to utilize ICT systems. There are many different example applications in retail and financial sectors which have a wealth of experience in utilizing ICT in complex systems. The observation and experience from these sectors indicate that security related to complex cyber-physical systems has been moving away from conventional layered security concepts toward more system approaches [14] .
There are many drivers behind holistic system security approaches: some technical and others policy and regulation related. On the technical side, intradomain security measures are not sufficient to address system-level threats. This often raises the need for a unified approach to analyzing, implementing, and managing security at system level. Such unified approach provides many benefits during various stages of the life cycle of the system: from planning to design and to implementation and operation. In the planning and design stage, organizations often have to consider legislative, standard-related, regulatory, and system/application details, including other guidelines and best information security and privacy practices. When developing system security and privacy by design specifications, a decision has to be made about using one or more of domainspecific security techniques in isolation or in combination to develop a solution addressing identified system and stakeholder requirements.
A unified framework such as the one discussed in this paper will help streamline security compliance as well as assist in effectively utilizing the overall space of security solutions. For example, eliminating the use of security schemes which overlap in the solution space can help improve the manageability and reduce complexity without compromising efficiency or security. Furthermore, during system operation stages, unified security solutions can help strengthen security and resilience as follows.
1) Preparedness and prevention: the USaPP approach provides a systematic way of mapping risk and impact assessment results to solutions to (preemptively) protect security and privacy by design. 2) Detection and response: the USaPP framework can improve traceability by embedding in its core design handles for the use of standardized anomaly detection techniques. 3) Mitigation and recovery: the USaPP framework provides a mapping of SG/SM information assets and processes to security controls, which helps segregate safe assets from potentially affected/infected ones, mitigate the cascading attacks due to interdependences, and pinpoint actions for faster recovery. 4) Coordination and cooperation: the USaPP approach can provide a common platform for international incidence reporting and cooperation.
We note that the four security and resilience elements listed previously are broadly known as the pillars of a critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) system in the field of ICT [3] .
A unified system's approach to SM security is key to methodically addressing the emerging challenges. This becomes clearer if, momentarily, we consider a nonunified approach. We suppose, for example, that a level of SM security preparedness is required to protect against unknown or obscure vulnerabilities and threats. The lack of a unified security framework means that the results of a threat dependence analysis might not be credible as these will be subject to particular methodologies employed in different parts of the SM system. On the other hand, a unified system approach helps consistently analyze threats that need complex solutions, including security interconnections among domains, traceability, and data handling.
With regard to customer privacy protection, we consider the premise that regulations are not a panacea [4] . Instead, we consider that a holistic approach and application of privacy by design solutions is a sine qua non for broad acceptance and success of SGs.
B. Principles
We consider the USaPP framework to be an integrated holistic approach to deal with the SM/SG security and privacy problems. A unified approach is necessary to study the impact of SM/SG attacks. This is because SM/SG is a complex cyberphysical system where vulnerability in one subsystem cascades in vulnerabilities in other subsystems. In nonintegrated security systems, complex attacks are typically dealt with by retrofitting security updates. Such problem-solving approaches have been proven to be obscure and ineffective. For example, ICT systems have long suffered from vulnerable security SW. Such a lax approach is not prudent for SM networks which is likely to be part of a critical energy infrastructure such as the SG. Instead, a unified approach should be considered from the design stage and should be applied systematically using open and standard solutions.
From a user perspective, unification facilitates the integration of conflicting SM functionalities and system control at home. For example, energy management and related data flow relationships could be simultaneously applied from different domains such as user, utility, and third party energy optimization agents. Such relationships become more complex as microgeneration and EVs are integrated in home SM networks. Furthermore, USaPP considers new market and business models where users could change energy supplier, tariffing, energy management contracts, or even control SW on a frequent basis (i.e., daily or less). In such case, both users and other stakeholders will need to have a unified way of ensuring that security and privacy is maintained during a "hand-off" from one (validated) component or stakeholder to another.
The integration of security and privacy is also essential. This is because privacy depends on security services such as confidentiality and access control. Hence, retrofitting privacy protection mechanisms is susceptible to attacks if security services are not designed with privacy in mind.
In general, as heterogeneous communication systems converge, SM communications will integrate with ad hoc networks, the Internet, cloud services, and etc. For example, a roaming SG customer may wish to initiate an authenticated flow of information between his home gateway and a remote device. Such data could, for example, be used to authorize access to remote facilities. If privacy is required, the customer may also wish to maintain anonymity. The extrapolation and combination of multidomain information such as energy consumption data, location information, lifestyle information, and other personal information increase the potential both for richer applications and services as well as security threats and damages. Future integration of systems and services requires transparent USaPP by design more than any other time.
The evolution of SM systems also requires scalable and future proof architectures. For example, consider the case where the collection frequency of smart meter data and control functionality change. This change may increase the risk of data privacy infringements and remote attacks such as impersonated control messages. A scalable security system should be prepared to respond to such changes, e.g., by providing customer alerts and handles that help adjust protection levels as required. 
C. Framework Elements
Given the system requirements outlined in previous sections, in this section, we propose a USaPP framework with an emphasis on home solutions, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . However, we also consider that the proposed framework can be adopted for use within the scope of a broader SM/SG security system, such as the EV charging use case discussed in Section VII.
We organize SM USaPP solutions in the following three classes. That is, this class is responsible for configuring home SM operations and resolving conflicting requirements (e.g., energy saving versus privacy versus user overrides versus SG overrides). Each one of the aforementioned three classes integrates both security and privacy protection measures and comprises three subclasses, which are described immediately in the following discussion.
V. MAP OF USAPP SOLUTIONS
In this section, we discuss in further detail the components of the USaPP framework in Fig. 2 .
A. Communication Security 1) Cryptosystem: Remote access and control within an SM system, such as DR functionality, may involve the following: 1) heterogeneous private or public networks, such as the TCP/ IP-based networks (Internet), Clouds, and WMNs; 2) many different devices, such as sensors, access points, and smart meters; and 3) different actors, such as utilities, grid operators, and customers. Communication security for such systems entails key management in different security domains. However, all NAN/WAN sensors and smart meters of a city may all need to be integrated in a single security cryptosystem involving maintenance of possibly millions of cryptographic keys and other credentials. Hence, SM communication security needs to combine large-scale economical key management and cryptography that can be carried out effectively on devices with limited processing power.
The design of an SM key management system is an active area of research. This could, for example, be based on existing systems such as PKI and identity-based encryption (IBE). IBE, in particular, is a strong candidate cryptosystem being deployed in SG/SM systems as it allows devices with low computation power to start sending messages without a need to contact a key server.
In general, a mixture of hierarchical, decentralized, delegated, or hybrid security schemes may be feasible. Preferably, a candidate scheme should include secure bootstrapping protocols, i.e., it should provide effective means to initialize new devices. Furthermore, critical security operations, such as key updates, should preferably employ group key management techniques, such as "defense in depth" techniques used in nuclear or military control systems, to mitigate the impact of compromised head-ends (or trusted people) [12] .
2) Routing Security: Network routing architecture has an impact on security. For example, consider a NAN implemented using WSN in which a number of intermediate wireless nodes aggregate traffic to optimize bandwidth usage and increase network reliability. Assuming an end-to-end encryption, aggregation might be as simple as concatenation of encrypted data. Alternatively, secure aggregation might use additive privacy homomorphism protocols [15] . End-to-end security ensures that data security services are resilient to compromised or rogue aggregators. Furthermore, a multilayer and/or cross-layer approach to security (including physical layer (or PHY), medium access control (or MAC), and network layer or multihop protocol) may be required to protect against DoS attacks such as flooding attacks. For example, the security of the IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) protocol may provide integrity and authentication.
3) Network Privacy: Privacy protection requires standard security services such as confidentiality, authentication, and access control. Such security services need to be employed at different SM layers, including communications, storage, and computing platforms. However, that kind of measures may not suffice. For example, end-to-end communication security may only guarantee message payload protection. Private information may still be exposed from "shallow packet inspection" (e.g., analysis of IP addresses), which is feasible in WMNs such as 6LoWPAN. That is, network privacy also requires network anonymity, as defined in Section III-C. In such cases, possible protection mechanisms include network mixes such as onion routing [16] .
In a broader SM network system, different levels of SM data anonymity may be achieved as SM data are cascaded in downstream systems. This can be engineered by effectively removing different degrees of privacy information from SM data in intermediate systems/aggregators. We note that an SM aggregator may also offer undetectability (as defined in Section III-C). For example, the aggregation of the metered load signatures of (sufficiently) large blocks of homes will effectively reduce the probability in detecting a particular IOI such as the operation of a TV set [4] .
B. Secure Computing
1) HW and SW Security: Secure computing solutions involve the protection of programmable HW components, including SW and firmware. Security holes such as backdoors and SW bugs may allow hackers to compromise standard cyber security solutions such as cryptographic protocols offering authentication, access control, and accountability (AAA).
SM systems may include small-(e.g., embedded) to largescale (e.g., server type) computing platforms. Such devices need to employ well-designed operating system kernel security architectures such as firewalls to protect against both malware and poor user practices, such as poor storage of important cryptographic keys, poor user/system trust and password management, and social engineering.
The SM system should be resilient to both insider and incoming attacks from open interfaces while providing access permissions to authorized parties as appropriate. For example, access rights may be managed by a digital rights management system. Also, applications may communicate on complex distributed programming platforms such as mobile agents; this requires suitable mobile code security measures. Finally, the system should undergo continuous exhaustive penetration testing, bug fixing, and updating.
Certification and accreditation are critical processes in guaranteeing HW and SW security. Common criteria, FIPS 140, and PCI PTS are generic certification schemes. Additionally, ISA 99 standardizes security controls for embedded systems. However, extensions will be required to include security profiles for SM/SG, similar to those related to the smart card industry. Alternative, and quicker, tests include "white-box" and code audits, employed by the U.S. national SCADA test bed program. Certification governance may also consider an adaptation of the ISO 27K series of standards as it occurred with the telecommunication security.
2) Cyber-Physical Security Analysis: A holistic approach should be taken to analyze USaPP of the SM system. For example, SM communication security vulnerabilities can directly compromise billing, HEMS and DR functionalities, and grid stability. Hence, SM security should be integrated to address problems in both the cyber and energy domains. It is particularly important to design a unified intrusion detection system that will monitor and analyze both cyber and energy events, such as potential attacks and impacts. For example, intrusion detection checks may include key management and routing protocol operations, packet headers and payloads, security logs, traffic statistics, wireless signals, and system and data integrity. Additionally, honeypots may be used to isolate and analyze attacks [17] .
In such complex computing, communications, and energy management environment, it is important to simulate risks of the broader SM/SG system. That is, cascaded risk should be evaluated, whereby compromise of one system leads to compromise of a downstream system. A risk analysis model is often recommended for the SG [3] as it will help proactively and reactively identify system anomalies and take appropriate protection measures, including system security alerts.
3) Reliability and Availability: The reliability and availability of energy, in the physical sense, probably form the most critical security requirements. However, it is wrong to consider data integrity and confidentiality less important, as such security services may be cross-correlated. For example, lack of data integrity may yield unreliable billing. Even worse, compromised AAA may allow intruders to manipulate SM appliances and even cause physical damages (e.g., one could force the gas heaters to operate on full power), let alone potential greater SG threats such as substation sabotages leading to system breakdown and widespread energy blackouts (which we do not study here). Reliability can be induced by means of redundancy. One such example is depicted in Fig. 3 , where the integrity of gathered billing data X can be verified if an integrity check Y = f (X) is fed back to be compared with X. Sending back Y instead of X increases the level of security when Y is sent over an untrusted network.
We note that the simple integrity check scheme in Fig. 3 may also be used for privacy-friendly computations using zeroknowledge proofs, in which case X may represent encrypted SM data that cannot be decrypted by the utility and Y = f (X) may represent the outcome of an encrypted function that calculates, for example, the bill [15] . Reusing architectural and protocol components for different reliability, security, or privacy services again highlights the need for a unified system design approach.
Survivability functionality also needs to be in place to handle emergency situations when critical security services fail. Solutions may involve the addition of system redundancy functionalities such as different ways to access system components. For example, a home gateway may be simultaneously accessed through different communication networks. Also, critical devices may be accessed by more than one gateway or access point. Finally, multiple parties, such as delegates and escrow services, may be used to add diversity in AAA services. In such cases, critical devices may need to maintain multiple (backup) crypto keys. This is discussed further in Section V-C2.
C. System Control 1) Private Data Handling:
Secure data handling requires transparent policies, trust management, and compliance enforcement mechanisms. Architectural solutions for data handling include privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs), which may employ a variety of cryptographic or anonymity protocols. For example, PETs may be based on standard "privacy principles" such as notice and purpose, choice and consent, collection and scope, use and retention, access, disclosure to third parties and limited use, security for privacy, quality, and monitoring and enforcement [18] . Access to data should be controlled with cryptographic protocols.
PETs could also be used to assess privacy risks and moderate SM data communication and handling. SM privacy risk may be quantified by analyzing the leakage or exposure of PII to different parties. Privacy protection risk assessment depends on privacy parameters such as the following: 1) the value of the data; 2) the ownership of the data; 3) the data access and usage permissions given to different parties; and 4) the degree the data owner trusts other parties with the data [18] .
Harmonizing privacy regulations across different legal systems and cultures is not straightforward. For example, in the USA, there are 51 different standards for privacy: one for each one of the 50 states plus one federal standard. Regarding data ownership, each state has different rules: in some states, it is the individual; in some others, it is the electrical company; and in others, it is a third party.
We also support the premise that trusting stakeholders for complying with regulations is not a panacea for protecting privacy. This is because regulations are often equivocal and not easily enforced. History (e.g., of the Internet) teaches that "legitimate" data mining and exploitation techniques evolve quickly when there are financial incentives. To overcome this problem, it is desirable to define a common unified language in order to design validated contractual customer-stakeholder relationships in a structural manner.
2) Spheres of Control: Spheres of control are useful to mitigate vulnerabilities by giving different levels of control to different trusted parties for different data or functionality. For example, as a generalization of the work in [19] , we suggest that private data could be segregated into the following categories. 1) Customer data: these could be low-frequency attributable data such as data used for billing. 2) Technical data: these could be high-frequency SM data such as data supporting DR/DSM. 3) Strictly personal data: these could be per unit data sampled at the highest frequency used for personal or private business purposes.
The difference between the aforementioned categories of data is that each data set contains different amounts of information. That is, customer data will have a low information content, while strictly personal data will have a high information content. Thus, the leakage of the latter will pose a greater risk to customer privacy.
It becomes clear that empowering the user to control access to granular SM data, including giving consent for access to SM/SG stakeholders, is key to implementing a hierarchical access control system for privacy preservation. For example, the Expert Group 2 of the European Smart Grids Task Force (SGTF), set up by the European Commission (EC), has recommended in [20] that technical SM data should be anonymized with means of data aggregation, as previously discussed in Section V-A3.
Apart from using aggregation, data privacy and control may be further advocated with the introduction of trusted third parties, such as escrows. The benefit here is that an independent escrow service allows secure end-to-end aggregation of SM data payloads in a very scalable manner.
The escrow-based anonymization scheme proposed in [19] introduces a structural difference to a smart meter within which two separate IDs are embedded, as depicted in Fig. 4 : one anonymous high-frequency ID (HFID) and one attributable low-frequency ID (LFID). The idea is to use HFID to send technical data and LFID to send customer data. The key to this idea is that HFID will never be known to the utility; however, the utility can verify the integrity and authenticity of associated messages with the help of the escrow.
We note that multiple-ID HW architectures, as in Fig. 4 , may support the following: 1) escrow anonymization discussed here; 2) group key management protocols for attack impact mitigation discussed in Section V-A1; or 3) backup keys trust for emergency HW control discussed in Section V-B3. Such potential multipurpose use of cryptographic keys again illustrates the importance for having a USaPP design.
3) Secure Energy Management: The concept of privacy via undetectability discussed in Section III-C adopts the fundamental assumption that hiding home appliance usage patterns is a matter of "privacy of personal behavior," i.e., "the right of individuals to keep any knowledge of their activities, and their choices, from being shared with others" [18] . In this context, SM privacy can be studied as an undetectability property of appliance load signatures [21] . Undetectability can effectively be enforced by controlling the energy flow within a home so that a portion of a consumption demand runs off a rechargeable battery, rather than directly off the grid, as shown in Fig. 5 . The battery system may manage energy flow in a manner advantageous to customer privacy by masking load signatures in a way that makes it harder to detect appliance usage patterns.
The problem of energy or SM data perturbation (e.g., by means of battery) can further be approached from an information theoretic perspective, as a tradeoff problem between privacy preservation versus loss of benefit (utility) [22] .
From the aforementioned discussion, it becomes clear that HEMS decision-making algorithms can effectively impact SM data privacy. However, the degree to which this is true depends on deployed spheres of control discussed in Section V-C2.
It should be clarified that private energy management may conflict with other SM functionality such as DR/DSM or energy pricing arbitrage and is bounded by the physical limitations of the battery. For example, p B (t) in Fig. 5 might contain loads that 1) have been shifted in an undesirable manner and/or 2) reveal some appliance (and battery) usage patterns. The development of optimal privacy preservation and/or cost minimization algorithms by using a rechargeable battery is a problem of future research.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. SM/SG Risk Assessment
The process of evaluating the security of a system typically involves the specification of (baseline or increased level) security requirements, the identification and analysis of applicable threats and vulnerabilities, and the application of appropriate security controls, such as the ones discussed in Section V. Threat analysis, in particular, can be performed following different approaches as follows.
1) Top-down approach: threats and vulnerabilities are identified for specific scenarios. 2) Bottom-up approach: "common" security requirements (such as integrity, confidentiality, authentication, accountability, availability, and anonymity) are analyzed for the various system components and functions. The security analysis of complex systems, such as SM/SG, is commonly directed by regulatory frameworks for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and CIIP. One of the key elements of such CIP/CIIP is the application of risk assessment methodologies, including dependability and interdependence analysis.
Current risk assessments used by distribution system operators are not good to deal with the very distributed nature of SG/SM systems [3] . This challenge has been recognized by the EC SGTF and Mandate M/490 Smart Grid Coordination Group and Smart Grid Information Security (SGIS) Working Groups, which are currently developing a risk assessment toolkit [2] .
We note that, even though the USaPP framework uses principles of risk assessment, it does not specify nor it depends on particular processes a risk assessment may entail. Instead, the purpose of USaPP is to standardize and unify a process of methodically identifying security controls within the USaPP classified solution space. This process will, in retrospect, facilitate systematic risk assessment as it is underpinned by assumptions regarding existing security controls.
B. System Integration and Benefits
As previously discussed, the USaPP framework helps map security analysis results (e.g., prioritized security system design or update requirements) to security controls and solutions. At system level, the integration of USaPP with standard information security management processes can be seen in Fig. 6 . This system's approach of a holistic security management consists of the following processes. 1) Stakeholder analysis: this involves a stock taking of SG/SM stakeholders' development drivers and critical requirements, including policy-driven rulebases, standards' compliance, market sustainability, and customer satisfaction. This analysis helps formulate a minimal set of highlevel security and privacy goals. 2) Functionality and use cases: functional requirements and specific use cases have their custom security and privacy requirements. These custom requirements become more specific by mapping the corresponding functions and operations into a reference system architecture. Furthermore, the importance of these requirements may be filtered by linking them with the high-level goals obtained from the stakeholder analysis. 3) Risk assessment: the reference architecture can be further used as a basis to identify potential use case threats and vulnerabilities and to assess their potential impact to the system. This helps identify the set of security weaknesses that pose high risk and that will need to be addressed. 4) USaPP solution space: this involves using the USaPP framework to help identify security controls in a unified and systematic manner. This process will be further analyzed later on in this section. 5) Update mechanism: assuming that a (chosen) security measure is implemented and, thus, the reference architecture is updated, the risk assessment and USaPP application could be performed iteratively to make sure that threats to security and privacy pose a low risk. Additionally, the process is reiterated when a new use case or functionality is inserted or when the stakeholder goals change.
We note that the USaPP process in Fig. 6 is based on risk analysis principles used by the EC SGIS [2] , combined with the Dutch methodology for specifying SM privacy requirements [13] .
The process of using USaPP to help organize the search of required solutions is given in greater detail in Fig. 7 . This operational methodology comprises the following steps.
1) The system security (and privacy) requirements are identified and grouped for each separate use case. 2) Given a security requirement, security interdependences are identified across different domains. In SM systems and in this example implementation, we consider the following four distinct domains: house, DER/EV, distribution, and retail. Each one of these domains is further organized in two orthogonal categories. The first one is the physical domain, which concerns the security of HW components, and the second one is the cyber domain, which concerns the set of (secure virtual) entities that are allowed to access and actuate on the reference domain (and potentially irrespective of their physical location). 3) Given a certain location in the horizontal plane of Fig. 7 , which corresponds to a use case requirement for a certain domain category, a designer is expected to search the pool of USaPP solutions, which are grouped into three top-level classes and further second-level subclasses, as shown in Fig. 2 . 4) The application of each USaPP (subclass) solution is further broken down into five layers: business, function, information, network, and component layers. The business layer corresponds to solutions that involve organizational or regulatory aspects. The function layer corresponds to solutions that involve services and logical processes. The information layer corresponds to solutions for data models and credentials. The network layer represents solutions for mechanisms and protocols that support data communications. Finally, the component layer corresponds to solutions that help protect platforms that host functions, information, and network elements. This layered classification is similar to the layers of the European SG architectural model [2] . 5) Given that a security requirement for a domain can be addressed by employing a solution in an interdependent layer of the SG, the systematic reduction of the search space facilitates a rigorous and efficient search.
Given the aforementioned methodology, it becomes clearer that the benefit of USaPP is that it helps eradicate fragmentation in the application of security measures, which has traditionally been based on the insightful considerations of security experts. The proposed USaPP classification helps specify a minimum set of standards and regulatory mechanisms by mitigating duplicated security services of overlaying security controls. A minimum set of standards will concern a common/unified reference architecture and common security management processes. This helps justify the premise that USaPP is advantageous as compared to standard security risk analysis and solution mapping methods as it improves interoperability and standardizes such security processes. At large scale, USaPP could further provide a common platform for national coordination, e.g., through computer emergency response teams (CERTs), which could play a role in SG incident management [3] .
VII. CASE STUDY: EV CHARGING SECURITY
This section presents an EV charging case study to demonstrate how the USaPP framework can be applied to address the security and privacy issues in an SM/SG system.
A. Controlled EV Charging
EVs are envisioned to be an integral part of the future SG. This is because, in addition to functioning as vehicles, they can also be used as the following: 1) storage facilities for any surplus electricity (e.g., electricity generated by intermittent renewable sources) and 2) DERs when they discharge their batteries and feed electricity back to the grid [23] .
However, letting users to recharge their EVs in an uncontrolled manner could endanger the stability of the grid [24] . To prevent this or to reduce the chance of destabilizing the grid, EV charging should be done in a controlled (coordinated) manner [6] . For example, EVs should be recharged when the grid is lightly loaded and/or when there is surplus electricity. In order to influence the times when users recharge their EVs, a pricedriven incentive-based DR mechanism could be put in place, e.g., adaptive electricity pricing that changes depending on the current state of the grid; examples of such pricing mechanisms include real-time pricing, time of use, critical peak pricing, etc.
In addition, grid operators would offer payments for providing ancillary services to the grid (e.g., frequency regulation, DR, spinning reserve, etc.) [23] . EVs are suitable for offering such services due to their fast reaction capabilities. However, to be eligible, an ancillary service provider has to be able to offer at least a certain amount of flexible demand. As an EV typically has a limited battery capacity, there is a need for a new entity, EV AGGregator (EVAGG), to be created. EVAGG will aggregate the batteries of a number of EVs and will represent their users in the electricity market, i.e., it will act as a middleman between users and grid operators. Fig. 8 illustrates the necessary interactions among entities involved. More precisely, if an EV user agrees to offer ancillary services to the grid, the EV's battery will be added to the EVAGG's aggregated load. With this flexible load, the EVAGG could bid in the electricity market for offering ancillary services. If the bid is accepted, the EVAGG will receive instructions from the grid operators to adjust its load. To comply with the instructions, the EVAGG may change the charging process of some of the EVs (e.g., adjust recharging levels, terminate recharging, commence discharging, etc.) by sending control signals (CSs) to some of the EVs. In return, for the load provided, the grid operators will pay the EVAGG which will, in turn, pass some of the payment to the EV users. This is another mechanism to incentivize users to charge their EVs in a way that it would bring benefits to all parties concerned. Fig. 9 illustrates one of several possible EV charging scenarios. Here, it is assumed that user B (Ub) visits user A's (Ua) home and charges his EV (EVb) on the premises of Ua. Ua and Ub have contracts for electricity supply with utility companies, utility A (Uta) and utility B (Utb), respectively. Ub also has contract with EVAGG for offering ancillary services. It is assumed that Ua has a renewable energy source (RES) on her premises.
B. Exemplar EV Charging Scenario
Depending on the amount of electricity generated from RES, during recharging, EVb may just get electricity supplied by the RES (if RES has sufficient stock), by the grid (if RES has zero stock), or by both RES and the grid (if RES has some stock but not sufficient for EVb's demand). Depending on these different situations, the payee of Ub's payment and the amount payable to the payee may vary as well. In other words, Ub may need to pay for the electricity to Ua, to Uta, or to both of them.
Similarly, if EVb is discharging, depending on the Ua's current demand for electricity, the electricity fed by the EVb could be used by Ua's home appliances and could be fed back to the grid, or some could be used by Ua's appliances, and some could be fed back to the grid. Depending on the different cases, Ub may be paid by Ua, by Uta, or by both of them. In addition, Ub may also receive payment from EVAGG for any ancillary services provided by the EVb to the grid. Moreover, the time, level, and continuance of the charging may also depend on the following: 1) the user's preferences; 2) the available electricity generated by the local RES; 3) the current price signal; 4) the state of the distribution networks; and 5) any CSs sent by EVAGG, etc.
C. Addressing Security and Privacy Issues Using USaPP
In the aforementioned example, the charging of EVs requires the involvement of multiple entities and potentially complex interactions. For example, Uta would need to deliver the current electricity price to Ua and would also access her meter readings (for billing purposes), EVAGG would need to have real-time communication with EVb to obtain data about its battery's current status (to be able to use EVb as an ancillary TABLE I  EV CHARGING SECURITY ISSUES provider), distribution network operators would need to access meter readings of Ua (to be informed about the grid's overall demand), etc. Such a complex process not only introduces a large number of security and privacy concerns but also dictates that the approach to the security and privacy concerns should be structured, integrated, and unified.
For example, adversaries may try to impersonate different entities (e.g., Uta, Utb, EVAGG, etc.), eavesdrop, and/or tamper with the messages (e.g., pricing signal, CSs, etc.) communicated in EV charging sessions in an attempt to destabilize the grid. This could lead to disruptions of electricity supplies and could even threaten the national security of a country. From the privacy point of view, knowing an EV's identity, its location, and its user's identity may be sufficient for a perpetrator to profile an EV user or to prepare for a further attack in the name of the user.
To analyze these threats, we need to identify the interactions and entities involved, thus addressing the key management issues ensuring the right keys are shared only among authorized entities (within the framework of a cryptosystem based, for example, on a PKI or IBE). In addition, we also need to consider routing security and to secure data aggregation to corroborate the confidentiality of SM data. Furthermore, EVb electricity consumption data measured at the EV supply equipment would be communicated to Utb and EVAGG (for billing purposes), and EVAGG would be sending CSs to EVb. As these data are directly related with the current charging session, secure end-to-end and peer-to-peer communication would be more appropriate. If Ub wishes to preserve his location privacy, i.e., wishes to hide the fact that he has ever visited Ua's home, then network privacy techniques should be considered, such as mix networks, onion routing, or anonymizers.
Other types of threats to EV charging include legitimate but not genuine data or commands sent by different entities. For example, incorrectly executed optimization of EVs' charging schedules could trigger an EV to start recharging at peak times causing financial losses to its user.
Furthermore, protecting EV users' privacy is a challenging issue. There can be the following privacy-related scenarios: 1) Ua may not want to reveal to Uta that there is an EV (in our case EVb) using the charging facility; 2) Ub may not want to reveal his identity or EVb's identity and EVb's electricity consumption to Uta or unauthorized eavesdroppers; and 3) Ub may not want to reveal identity and EVb's identity to EVAGG but still acts as ancillary provider and gets payments for offering this service.
To address these privacy issues, different methods can be employed. For example, in the first scenario, a secure energy management mechanism can be deployed by managing EVb's recharging process in a way that it mimics electricity usage of standard home appliances. In such a way, Uta would not be able to detect the presence of any EV charging processes. In the second scenario, Ub's anonymity can be provided by employing trusted third parties or pseudonyms. However, anonymity may not be sufficient to prevent adversaries from linking together EVb's multiple charging sessions. The nonlinkability property can be achieved by assigning a dynamic identifier to each of the charging sessions performed by Ub. Of course, a controlled and authorized linkage of Ub's multiple charging sessions should be supported to ensure accountability and traceability in the event of a dispute or security incident. In such a way, EVAGG would only need to know the anonymous Ub's contracted utility company (Utb) in order to make payments to Ub (via Utb) and request Ub's real ID revelation in case of disputes (solution for scenario three). Table I lists some potential EV charging security issues and categorizes them into the classes of the USaPP framework.
D. Importance of USaPP
From the aforementioned EV charging scenario analysis, it would appear that the USaPP framework is useful in providing a systematic way to identify and classify a number of security and privacy issues as in Table I . Such a classification would help designers to explore better the pool of existing solutions. For example, the false CS, false price signal, and false network status signal issues could be addressed by the same or similar solutions.
Without applying USaPP, it is likely that designers would provide solutions to different issues, and these solutions may not integrate with each other. Therefore, new solutions should be planned and designed in a way that they do not overlap or conflict with solutions that address security and privacy issues belonging to different classes.
Using this systematic way of tackling different subcases could increase the efficiency and reliability of the entire design and could launch a cycle of products related to the EV charging application as well as the operation and management of the system.
We note that a detailed presentation of how the USaPP process methodology and solution mapping may be used, in the EV charging scenario, to systematically analyze, design, and maintain a level of security and privacy under a range of attacks is not within the scope of this paper. This is left for future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The interconnection of cross-disciplinary systems (such as HEMS, HAN, and WSN/WAN) with sufficient support of their interdependences (such as collection, aggregation, and analysis of SM data, real-time pricing, DR/DSM programs, etc.) and the involvement of multiple SG stakeholders (e.g., consumers, utilities, grid operators, and third-party service providers) make SM systems highly complex. Equally complex is the analysis of security and privacy attacks that may cascade from one SM system domain into another SM/SG domain.
In this paper, we have presented the case for a unified approach that attempts to address home SM security and privacy requirements by fusing different solutions and mapping them to a number of tightly interrelated system components. In particular, by classifying discussed solutions into three logical groups, namely, communications, computing, and system control (as in Fig. 2) , and orthogonal domains and layers (as in Fig. 7) , the proposed USaPP framework helps address SM network security and privacy issues, occurring in different cyber-physical parts of the system, for different use cases, in a systematic and holistic manner.
We believe that the proposed USaPP framework can be used as a guideline for SM and SG security designers and researchers. Future work may be motivated by many of the technical problems and solutions embedded in different areas of the framework.
